Why neuroscience may be able to explain consciousness by Crick, Francis & Koch, Christof
Conscious experience is at oncethe most familiar thing in theworld and the most mysterious.
There is nothing we know about more
directly than consciousness, but it is
extraordinarily hard to reconcile it with
everything else we know. Why does it
exist? What does it do? How could it
possibly arise from neural processes in
the brain? These questions are among
the most intriguing in all of science.
From an objective viewpoint, the brain
is relatively comprehensible. When you
look at this page, there is a whir of pro-
cessing: photons strike your retina, elec-
trical signals are passed up your optic
nerve and between diÝerent areas of
your brain, and eventually you might
respond with a smile, a perplexed frown
or a remark. But there is also a subjec-
tive aspect. When you look at the page,
you are conscious of it, directly experi-
encing the images and words as part of
your private, mental life. You have vivid
impressions of colored ßowers and vi-
brant sky. At the same time, you may
be feeling some emotions and forming
some thoughts. Together such experi-
ences make up consciousness: the sub-
jective, inner life of the mind.
For many years, consciousness was
shunned by researchers studying the
brain and the mind. The prevailing view
was that science, which depends on ob-
jectivity, could not accommodate some-
thing as subjective as consciousness.
The behaviorist movement in psychol-
ogy, dominant earlier in this century,
concentrated on external behavior and
disallowed any talk of internal mental
processes. Later, the rise of cognitive
science focused attention on processes
inside the head. Still, consciousness re-
mained oÝ-limits, Þt only for late-night
discussion over drinks.
Over the past several years, however,
an increasing number of neuroscien-
tists, psychologists and philosophers
have been rejecting the idea that con-
sciousness cannot be studied and are
attempting to delve into its secrets. As
might be expected of a Þeld so new,
there is a tangle of diverse and conßict-
ing theories, often using basic concepts
in incompatible ways. To help unsnarl
the tangle, philosophical reasoning is
vital.
The myriad views within the Þeld
range from reductionist theories, ac-
cording to which consciousness can be
explained by the standard methods of
neuroscience and psychology, to the
position of the so-called mysterians,
who say we will never understand con-
sciousness at all. I believe that on close
analysis both of these views can be
seen to be mistaken and that the truth
lies somewhere in the middle.
Against reductionism I will argue that
the tools of neuroscience cannot pro-
vide a full account of conscious experi-
ence, although they have much to oÝer.
Against mysterianism I will hold that
consciousness might be explained by a
new kind of theory. The full details of
such a theory are still out of reach, but
careful reasoning and some educated
inferences can reveal something of its
general nature. For example, it will prob-
ably involve new fundamental laws, and
the concept of information may play a
central role. These faint glimmerings
suggest that a theory of consciousness
may have startling consequences for our
view of the universe and of ourselves.
The Hard Problem
Researchers use the word Òconscious-nessÓ in many diÝerent ways. To
clarify the issues, we Þrst have to sepa-
rate the problems that are often clus-
tered together under the name. For this
purpose, I Þnd it useful to distinguish
between the Òeasy problemsÓ and the
Òhard problemÓ of consciousness. The
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easy problems are by no means trivialÑ
they are actually as challenging as most
in psychology and biologyÑbut it is
with the hard problem that the central
mystery lies.
The easy problems of consciousness
include the following: How can a hu-
man subject discriminate sensory stim-
uli and react to them appropriately?
How does the brain integrate informa-
tion from many diÝerent sources and
use this information to control behav-
ior? How is it that subjects can verbal-
ize their internal states? Although all
these questions are associated with con-
sciousness, they all concern the objec-
tive mechanisms of the cognitive sys-
tem. Consequently, we have every rea-
son to expect that continued work in
cognitive psychology and neuroscience
will answer them.
The hard problem, in contrast, is the
question of how physical processes in
the brain give rise to subjective experi-
ence. This puzzle involves the inner as-
pect of thought and perception: the way
things feel for the subject. When we see,
for example, we experience visual sen-
sations, such as that of vivid blue. Or
think of the ineÝable sound of a distant
oboe, the agony of an intense pain, the
sparkle of happiness or the meditative
quality of a moment lost in thought. All
are part of what I am calling conscious-
ness. It is these phenomena that pose
the real mystery of the mind.
To illustrate the distinction, consider
a thought experiment devised by the
Australian philosopher Frank Jackson.
Suppose that Mary, a neuroscientist in
the 23rd century, is the worldÕs leading
expert on the brain processes responsi-
ble for color vision. But Mary has lived
her whole life in a black-and-white
room and has never seen any other col-
ISOLATED NEUROSCIENTIST in a black-
and-white room knows everything about
how the brain processes colors but does
not know what it is like to see them.
This scenario suggests that knowledge
of the brain does not yield complete
knowledge of conscious experience.
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ors. She knows everything there is to
know about physical processes in the
brainÑits biology, structure and
function. This understanding en-
ables her to grasp everything there
is to know about the easy prob-
lems: how the brain discrimi-
nates stimuli, integrates infor-
mation and produces verbal re-
ports. From her knowledge of
color vision, she knows the way
color names correspond with
wavelengths on the light spec-
trum. But there is still something
crucial about color vision that Mary
does not know: what it is like to ex-
perience a color such as red. It follows
that there are facts about conscious ex-
perience that cannot be de-
duced from physical facts about
the functioning of the brain.
Indeed, nobody knows why
these physical processes are ac-
companied by conscious expe-
rience at all. Why is it that when our
brains process light of a certain wave-
length, we have an experience of deep
purple? Why do we have any experi-
ence at all? Could not an unconscious
automaton have performed the same
tasks just as well? These are questions
that we would like a theory of con-
sciousness to answer.
I am not denying that consciousness
arises from the brain. We know, for ex-
ample, that the subjective experience
of vision is closely linked to processes
in the visual cortex. It is the link itself
that perplexes, however. Remarkably,
subjective experience seems to emerge
from a physical process. But we have
no idea how or why this is.
Is Neuroscience Enough?
Given the ßurry of recent work onconsciousness in neuroscience and
psychology, one might think this mys-
tery is starting to be cleared up. On
closer examination, however, it turns
out that almost all the current work ad-
dresses only the easy problems of con-
sciousness. The conÞdence of the reduc-
tionist view comes from the progress
on the easy problems, but none of this
makes any diÝerence where the hard
problem is concerned.
Consider the hypothesis put forward
by neurobiologists Francis Crick of the
Salk Institute for Biological Studies in
San Diego and Christof Koch of the Cal-
ifornia Institute of Technology. They
suggest that consciousness may arise
from certain oscillations in the cerebral
cortex, which become synchronized as
neurons Þre 40 times per second. Crick
and Koch believe the phenomenon
might explain how diÝerent attributes
of a single perceived object ( its color
and shape, for example), which are pro-
cessed in diÝerent parts of the brain,
are merged into a coherent whole. In
this theory, two pieces of information
become bound together precisely when
they are represented by synchronized
neural Þrings.
The hypothesis could conceivably elu-
cidate one of the easy problems about
how information is integrated in the
brain. But why should synchronized os-
cillations give rise to a visual experience,
no matter how much integration is tak-
ing place? This question involves the
hard problem, about which the theory
has nothing to oÝer. Indeed, Crick and
Koch are agnostic about whether the
hard problem can be solved by science
at all [see box on pages 84 and 85 ].
The same kind of critique could be
applied to almost all the recent work on
consciousness. In his 1991 book Con-
sciousness Explained, philosopher Dan-
iel C. Dennett laid out a sophisticated
theory of how numerous independent
processes in the brain combine to pro-
duce a coherent response to a perceived
event. The theory might do much to ex-
plain how we produce verbal reports on
our internal states, but it tells us very
little about why there should be a sub-
jective experience behind these reports.
Like other reductionist theories, Den-
nettÕs is a theory of the easy problems.
The critical common trait among these
easy problems is that they all concern
how a cognitive or behavioral function
is performed. All are ultimately ques-
tions about how the brain carries out
some taskÑhow it discriminates stim-
uli, integrates information, produces re-
ports and so on. Once neurobiology spe-
ciÞes appropriate neural mechanisms,
showing how the functions are per-
formed, the easy problems are solved.
The hard problem of conscious-
ness, in contrast, goes beyond
problems about how functions
are performed. Even if every be-
havioral and cognitive function
related to consciousness were
explained, there would still re-
main a further mystery: Why is
the performance of these func-
tions accompanied by conscious
experience? It is this additional
conundrum that makes the hard
problem hard.
The Explanatory Gap
Some have suggested that tosolve the hard problem, we
need to bring in new tools of
physical explanation: nonlinear
dynamics, say, or new discoveries
in neuroscience, or quantum me-
chanics. But these ideas suÝer from ex-
actly the same diÛculty. Consider a pro-
posal from Stuart R. HameroÝ of the
University of Arizona and Roger Pen-
rose of the University of Oxford. They
hold that consciousness arises from
quantum-physical processes taking
place in microtubules, which are protein
structures inside neurons. It is possible
(if not likely) that such a hypothesis will
lead to an explanation of how the brain
makes decisions or even how it proves
mathematical theorems, as HameroÝ
and Penrose suggest. But even if it does,
the theory is silent about how these
processes might give rise to conscious
experience. Indeed, the same problem
arises with any theory of consciousness
based only on physical processing.
The trouble is that physical theories
are best suited to explaining why sys-
tems have a certain physical structure
and how they perform various func-
tions. Most problems in science have
this form; to explain life, for example,
we need to describe how a physical sys-
tem can reproduce, adapt and metabo-
lize. But consciousness is a diÝerent
sort of problem entirely, as it goes be-
yond the explanation of structure and
function.
Of course, neuroscience is not irrele-
vant to the study of consciousness. For
one, it may be able to reveal the nature
of the neural correlate of conscious-
nessÑthe brain processes most directly
associated with conscious experience.
It may even give a detailed correspon-
dence between speciÞc processes in the
brain and related components of expe-
rience. But until we know why these pro-
cesses give rise to conscious experience
at all, we will not have crossed what phi-
losopher Joseph Levine has called the
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COLOR WHEEL arranges hues so that ones experienced
as similar are closest. Nearby colors also correspond
to similar perceptual representations in the brain.
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explanatory gap between physical pro-
cesses and consciousness. Making that
leap will demand a new kind of theory.
A True Theory of Everything
In searching for an alternative, a keyobservation is that not all entities in
science are explained in terms of more
basic entities. In physics, for example,
space-time, mass and charge (among
other things) are regarded as funda-
mental features of the world, as they
are not reducible to anything simpler.
Despite this irreducibility, detailed and
useful theories relate these entities to
one another in terms of fundamental
laws. Together these features and laws
explain a great variety of complex and
subtle phenomena.
It is widely believed that physics pro-
vides a complete catalogue of the uni-
verseÕs fundamental features and laws.
As physicist Steven Weinberg puts it in
his 1992 book Dreams of a Final Theo-
ry, the goal of physics is a Òtheory of
everythingÓ from which all there is to
know about the universe can be derived.
But Weinberg concedes that there is a
problem with consciousness. Despite
the power of physical theory, the exis-
tence of consciousness does not seem
to be derivable from physical laws. He
defends physics by arguing that it
might eventually explain what he calls
the objective correlates of conscious-
ness (that is, the neural correlates), but
of course to do this is not to explain
consciousness itself. If the existence of
consciousness cannot be derived from
physical laws, a theory of physics is not
a true theory of everything. So a Þnal
theory must contain an additional fun-
damental component.
Toward this end, I propose that con-
scious experience be considered a fun-
damental feature, irreducible to any-
thing more basic. The idea may seem
strange at Þrst, but consistency seems
to demand it. In the 19th century it
turned out that electromagnetic phe-
nomena could not be explained in terms
of previously known principles. As a
consequence, scientists introduced elec-
tromagnetic charge as a new fundamen-
tal entity and studied the associated
fundamental laws. Similar reasoning
should apply to consciousness. If exist-
ing fundamental theories cannot en-
compass it, then something new is re-
quired.
Where there is a fundamental prop-
erty, there are fundamental laws. In this
case, the laws must relate experience
to elements of physical theory. These
laws will almost certainly not interfere
with those of the physical world; it
seems that the latter form a closed sys-
tem in their own right. Rather the laws
will serve as a bridge, specifying how
experience depends on underlying phys-
ical processes. It is this bridge that will
cross the explanatory gap.
Thus, a complete theory will have two
components: physical laws, telling us
about the behavior of physical systems
from the inÞnitesimal to the cosmolog-
ical, and what we might call psycho-
physical laws, telling us how some of
those systems are associated with con-
scious experience. These two compo-
nents will constitute a true theory of
everything.
Searching for a Theory
Supposing for the moment that theyexist, how might we uncover such
psychophysical laws? The greatest hin-
drance in this pursuit will be a lack of
data. As I have described it, conscious-
ness is subjective, so there is no direct
way to monitor it in others. But this dif-
Þculty is an obstacle, not a dead end.
For a start, each one of us has access to
our own experiences, a rich trove that
can be used to formulate theories. We
can also plausibly rely on indirect infor-
mation, such as subjectsÕ descriptions
of their experiences. Philosophical ar-
guments and thought experiments also
have a role to play. Such methods have
limitations, but they give us more than
enough to get started.
These theories will not be conclusive-
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ly testable, so they will inevitably be
more speculative than those of more
conventional scientiÞc disciplines. Nev-
ertheless, there is no reason they should
not be strongly constrained to account
accurately for our own Þrst-person ex-
periences, as well as the evidence from
subjectsÕ reports. If we Þnd a theory
that Þts the data better than any other
theory of equal simplicity, we will have
good reason to accept it. Right now we
do not have even a single theory that
Þts the data, so worries about testabil-
ity are premature.
We might start by looking for high-
level bridging laws, connecting physical
processes to experience at an everyday
level. The basic contour of such a law
might be gleaned from the observation
that when we are conscious of some-
thing, we are generally able to act on it
and speak about itÑwhich are objective,
physical functions. Conversely, when
some information is directly available
for action and speech, it is generally con-
scious. Thus, consciousness correlates
well with what we might call Òaware-
nessÓ: the process by which informa-
tion in the brain is made globally avail-
able to motor processes such as speech
and bodily action.
The notion may seem trivial. But as
deÞned here, awareness is objective and
physical, whereas consciousness is not.
Some reÞnements to the deÞnition of
awareness are needed, in order to ex-
tend the concept to animals and infants,
which cannot speak. But at least in fa-
miliar cases, it is possible to see the
rough outlines of a psychophysical law:
where there is awareness, there is con-
sciousness, and vice versa.
To take this line of reasoning a step
further, consider the structure present
in the conscious experience. The expe-
rience of a Þeld of vision, for example,
is a constantly changing mosaic of col-
ors, shapes and patterns and as such
has a detailed geometric structure. The
fact that we can describe this structure,
reach out in the direction of many of
its components and perform other ac-
tions that depend on it suggests that
the structure corresponds directly to
that of the information made available
in the brain through the neural pro-
cesses of awareness.
Similarly, our experiences of color
have an intrinsic three-dimensional
structure that is mirrored in the struc-
ture of information processes in the
brainÕs visual cortex. This structure is il-
lustrated in the color wheels and charts
used by artists. Colors are arranged in
a systematic patternÑred to green on
one axis, blue to yellow on another, and
black to white on a third. Colors that are
close to one another on a color wheel
are experienced as similar [see illustra-
tion on page 82 ]. It is extremely likely
that they also correspond to similar per-
ceptual representations in the brain, as
part of a system of complex three-di-
mensional coding among neurons that
is not yet fully understood. We can re-
cast the underlying concept as a princi-
ple of structural coherence: the struc-
ture of conscious experience is mir-
rored by the structure of information
in awareness, and vice versa.
Another candidate for a psychophys-
ical law is a principle of organizational
invariance. It holds that physical sys-
tems with the same abstract organiza-
tion will give rise to the same kind of
conscious experience, no matter what
they are made of. For example, if the
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We believe that at the moment the best approach to theproblem of explaining consciousness is to concentrate on
finding what is known as the neural correlates of conscious-
ness—the processes in the brain that are most directly respon-
sible for consciousness. By locating the neurons in the cerebral
cortex that correlate best with conscious-
ness, and figuring out how they link to neu-
rons elsewhere in the brain, we may come
across key insights into what David J. Chal-
mers calls the hard problem: a full account-
ing of the manner in which subjective expe-
rience arises from these cerebral processes.
We commend Chalmers for boldly recog-
nizing and focusing on the hard problem at
this early stage, although we are not as en-
thusiastic about some of his thought experi-
ments. As we see it, the hard problem can be
broken down into several questions: Why do
we experience anything at all? What leads to
a particular conscious experience (such as
the blueness of blue)? Why are some aspects
of subjective experience impossible to con-
vey to other people (in other words, why are
they private)? We believe we have an answer to the last prob-
lem and a suggestion about the first two, revolving around a
phenomenon known as explicit neuronal representation.
What does “explicit” mean in this context? Perhaps the best
way to define it is with an example. In response to the image of
a face, say, ganglion cells fire all over the retina, much like the
pixels on a television screen, to generate an implicit represen-
tation of the face. At the same time, they can also respond to a
great many other features in the image, such as shadows, lines,
uneven lighting and so on. In contrast, some neurons high in
the hierarchy of the visual cortex respond mainly to the face or
even to the face viewed at a particular angle. Such neurons help
the brain represent the face in an explicit manner. Their loss, re-
sulting from a stroke or some other brain in-
jury, leads to prosopagnosia, an individual’s
inability to recognize familiar faces con-
sciously—even his or her own, although the
person can still identify a face as a face. Simi-
larly, damage to other parts of the visual cor-
tex can cause someone to lose the ability to
experience color, while still seeing in shades
of black and white, even though there is no
defect in the color receptors in the eye.
At each stage, visual information is reen-
coded, typically in a semihierarchical man-
ner. Retinal ganglion cells respond to a spot
of light. Neurons in the primary visual cor-
tex are most adept at responding to lines or
edges; neurons higher up might prefer a
moving contour. Still higher are those that
respond to faces and other familiar objects.
On top are those that project to pre-motor and motor structures
in the brain, where they fire the neurons that initiate such ac-
tions as speaking or avoiding an oncoming automobile.
Chalmers believes, as we do, that the subjective aspects of
an experience must relate closely to the firing of the neurons
corresponding to those aspects (the neural correlates). He de-
scribes a well-known thought experiment, constructed around a
hypothetical neuroscientist, Mary, who specializes in color per-
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precise interactions between our neu-
rons could be duplicated with silicon
chips, the same conscious experience
would arise. The idea is somewhat con-
troversial, but I believe it is strongly
supported by thought experiments de-
scribing the gradual replacement of
neurons by silicon chips [see box on
next page]. The remarkable implication
is that consciousness might someday
be achieved in machines.
Information: Physical and Experiential
The ultimate goal of a theory of con-sciousness is a simple and elegant
set of fundamental laws, analogous to
the fundamental laws of physics. The
principles described above are unlikely
to be fundamental, however. Rather
they seem to be high-level psychophys-
ical laws, analogous to macroscopic
principles in physics such as those of
thermodynamics or kinematics. What
might the underlying fundamental laws
be? No one knows, but I donÕt mind
speculating.
I suggest that the primary psycho-
physical laws may centrally involve the
concept of information. The abstract
notion of information, as put forward
in the 1940s by Claude E. Shannon of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, is that of a set of separate states
with a basic structure of similarities
and diÝerences between them. We can
think of a 10-bit binary code as an in-
formation state, for example. Such in-
formation states can be embodied in
the physical world. This happens
whenever they correspond to physical
states (voltages, say); the diÝerences be-
tween them can be transmitted along
some pathway, such as a telephone line.
We can also Þnd information embod-
ied in conscious experience. The pat-
tern of color patches in a visual Þeld,
for example, can be seen as analogous
to that of the pixels covering a display
screen. Intriguingly, it turns out that we
Þnd the same information states em-
bedded in conscious experience and in
underlying physical processes in the
brain. The three-dimensional encoding
of color spaces, for example, suggests
that the information state in a color ex-
perience corresponds directly to an in-
formation state in the brain. We might
even regard the two states as distinct
aspects of a single information state,
which is simultaneously embodied in
both physical processing and conscious
experience.
A natural hypothesis ensues. Perhaps
information, or at least some informa-
tion, has two basic aspects: a physical
one and an experiential one. This hy-
pothesis has the status of a fundamen-
tal principle that might underlie the re-
lation between physical processes and
experience. Wherever we Þnd conscious
experience, it exists as one aspect of an
information state, the other aspect of
which is embedded in a physical pro-
cess in the brain. This proposal needs
to be ßeshed out to make a satisfying
theory. But it Þts nicely with the princi-
ples mentioned earlierÑsystems with
the same organization will embody the
same information, for exampleÑand it
could explain numerous features of our
conscious experience.
The idea is at least compatible with
several others, such as physicist John
A. WheelerÕs suggestion that informa-
tion is fundamental to the physics of
the universe. The laws of physics might
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ception but has never seen a color. We believe the reason Mary
does not know what it is like to see a color, however, is that she
has never had an explicit neural representation of a color in her
brain, only of the words and ideas associated with colors. 
In order to describe a subjective visual experience, the infor-
mation has to be transmitted to the motor output stage of the
brain, where it becomes available for verbalization or other ac-
tions. This transmission always involves reencoding the infor-
mation, so that the explicit information expressed by the motor
neurons is related, but not identical, to the explicit information
expressed by the firing of the neurons associated with color ex-
perience, at some level in the visual hierarchy.
It is not possible, then, to convey with words and ideas the
exact nature of a subjective experience. It is possible, however,
to convey a difference between subjective experiences—to dis-
tinguish between red and orange, for example. This is possible
because a difference in a high-level visual cortical area will still
be associated with a difference in the motor stages. The impli-
cation is that we can never explain to other people the nature
of any conscious experience, only its relation to other ones.
The other two questions, concerning why we have consciousexperiences and what leads to specific ones, appear more
difficult. Chalmers proposes that they require the introduction
of “experience” as a fundamental new feature of the world, re-
lating to the ability of an organism to process information. But
which types of neuronal information produce consciousness?
And what makes a certain type of information correspond to
the blueness of blue, rather than the greenness of green? Such
problems seem as difficult as any in the study of consciousness.
We prefer an alternative approach, involving the concept of
“meaning.” In what sense can neurons that explicitly code for a
face be said to convey the meaning of a face to the rest of the
brain? Such a property must relate to the cell’s projective field—
its pattern of synaptic connections to neurons that code explic-
itly for related concepts. Ultimately, these connections extend
to the motor output. For example, neurons responding to a cer-
tain face might be connected to ones expressing the name of
the person whose face it is and to others for her voice, memo-
ries involving her and so on. Such associations among neurons
must be behaviorally useful—in other words, consistent with
feedback from the body and the external world.
Meaning derives from the linkages among these representa-
tions with others spread throughout the cortical system in a
vast associational network, similar to a dictionary or a relation-
al database. The more diverse these connections, the richer the
meaning. If, as in our previous example of prosopagnosia, the
synaptic output of such face neurons were blocked, the cells
would still respond to the person’s face, but there would be no
associated meaning and, therefore, much less experience. A
face would be seen but not recognized as such. 
Of course, groups of neurons can take on new functions, al-
lowing brains to learn new categories (including faces) and as-
sociate new categories with existing ones. Certain primitive as-
sociations, such as pain, are to some extent inborn but subse-
quently refined in life.
Information may indeed be the key concept, as Chalmers
suspects. Greater certainty will require consideration of highly
parallel streams of information, linked—as are neurons—in
complex networks. It would be useful to try to determine what
features a neural network (or some other such computational
embodiment) must have to generate meaning. It is possible
that such exercises will suggest the neural basis of meaning.
The hard problem of consciousness may then appear in an en-
tirely new light. It might even disappear.
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ultimately be cast in informational
terms, in which case we would have a
satisfying congruence between the con-
structs in both physical and psycho-
physical laws. It may even be that a
theory of physics and a theory of con-
sciousness could eventually be consoli-
dated into a single grander theory of
information.
A potential problem is posed by the
ubiquity of information. Even a ther-
mostat embodies some information,
for example, but is it conscious? There
are at least two possible responses.
First, we could constrain the fundamen-
tal laws so that only some information
has an experiential aspect, perhaps de-
pending on how it is physically pro-
cessed. Second, we might bite the bul-
let and allow that all information has
an experiential aspectÑwhere there is
complex information processing, there
is complex experience, and where there
is simple information processing, there
is simple experience. If this is so, then
even a thermostat might have experi-
ences, although they would be much
simpler than even a basic color experi-
ence, and there would certainly be no
accompanying emotions or thoughts.
This seems odd at Þrst, but if experi-
ence is truly fundamental, we might
expect it to be widespread. In any case,
the choice between these alternatives
should depend on which can be inte-
grated into the most powerful theory.
Of course, such ideas may be all
wrong. On the other hand, they might
evolve into a more powerful proposal
that predicts the precise structure of
our conscious experience from physi-
cal processes in our brains. If this proj-
ect succeeds, we will have good reason
to accept the theory. If it fails, other av-
enues will be pursued, and alternative
fundamental theories may be devel-
oped. In this way, we may one day re-
solve the greatest mystery of the mind.
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Whether consciousness could arise in a complex, syn-thetic system is a question many people find intrinsi-
cally fascinating. Although it may be decades or even cen-
turies before such a system is built, a simple thought ex-
periment offers strong evidence that an artificial brain, if
organized appropriately, would indeed have precisely the
same kind of conscious experiences as a human being.
Consider a silicon-based system in which the chips are
organized and function in the same way as the neurons in
your brain. That is, each chip in the
silicon system does exactly what its
natural analogue does and is inter-
connected to surrounding elements
in precisely the same way. Thus, the
behavior exhibited by the artificial
system will be exactly the same as
yours. The crucial question is: Will it
be conscious in the same way that
you are?
Let us assume, for the purpose of
argument, that it would not be. (Here
we use a reasoning technique known
as reductio ad absurdum, in which
the opposite hypothesis is assumed
and then shown to lead to an unten-
able conclusion.) That is, it either has
different experiences—an experience of blue, say, when you
are seeing red—or no experience at all. We will consider the
first case; the reasoning proceeds similarly in both cases.
Because chips and neurons have the same function, they
are interchangeable, with the proper interfacing. Chips
therefore can replace neurons, producing a continuum of
cases in which a successively larger proportion of neurons
are replaced by chips. Along this continuum, the conscious
experience of the system will also change. For example,
we might replace all the neurons in your visual cortex with
an identically organized version made of silicon. The re-
sulting brain, with an artificial visual cortex, will have a dif-
ferent conscious experience from the original: where you
had previously seen red, you may now experience purple
(or perhaps a faded pink, in the case where the wholly sil-
icon system has no experience at all).
Both visual cortices are then attached to your brain,
through a two-position switch. With the switch in one
mode, you use the natural visual
cortex; in the other, the artificial cor-
tex is activated. When the switch is
flipped, your experience changes
from red to purple, or vice versa.
When the switch is flipped repeated-
ly, your experiences “dance” be-
tween the two different conscious
states (red and purple), known as
qualia.
Because your brain’s organization
has not changed, however, there
can be no behavioral change when
the switch is thrown. Therefore,
when asked about what you are see-
ing, you will say that nothing has
changed. You will hold that you are
seeing red and have seen nothing but red—even though
the two colors are dancing before your eyes. This conclu-
sion is so unreasonable that it is best taken as a reductio
ad absurdum of the original assumption—that an artificial
system with identical organization and functioning has a
different conscious experience from that of a neural brain.
Retraction of the assumption establishes the opposite:
that systems with the same organization have the same
conscious experience. —D.J.C.
Dancing Qualia in a Synthetic Brain
IN THOUGHT EXPERIMENT, an apple
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